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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
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Testing Various Types of Cooperation Rewards in Social Dilemmas

Craig D. Parks

Washington State University, parkscd{at}mail.wsu.edu

Research on the rewarding of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has shown that very different types of reward strategies each seem to be effective at inducing high rates of cooperation in group members. This makes it difficult to determine how a cooperation reward motivates cooperation. This study systematically examined various components of cooperation reward schemes so as to help identify the general properties of an effective cooperation reward. Specifically, three features of a cooperation reward were manipulated: the number of group members who can receive the reward; when the reward is given; and whether reward reception is contingent upon performance. Four major effects emerged. First, performance-contingent, per-trial rewards produced high rates of cooperation. Second, competitive, performance-based rewards effectively maintained cooperation across trials. Next, a competitive, performance-based, per-trial reward scheme outperformed any other reward scheme in terms of rate of cooperation induced. Finally, rewards that were provided for simply participating in the group had an inhibitory effect on cooperation, producing a lesser rate of cooperation than baseline.

Key Words: competition • delay of outcomes • interdependence • performance contingencies • prisoner’s dilemma

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, Vol. 3, No. 4, 339-350 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/1368430200003004001


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