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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations
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Egoism Bias in Social Dilemmas with Resource Uncertainty

Mathias Gustafsson

Göteborg University, Sweden, Mathias.Gustafsson{at}psy.gu.se

Anders Biel

Göteborg University, Sweden

Tommy Gärling

Göteborg University, Sweden, Tommy.Garling{at}psy.gu.se

In Experiment 1 we investigated size estimates and requests from an uncertain resource in a common-pool resource dilemma. In Experiment 2, we examined contributions in a public-good dilemma with an uncertain provision threshold when participants were informed about others’ pessimistically biased estimates of the resource size or provision threshold. Supporting an individual outcome-desirability bias, but refuting a perceptual bias and an egoism bias, participants in Experiment 1 did not estimate size differently, and they cooperated more, rather than less, when they were informed about others’ estimates. Likewise, participants contributed more in Experiment 2 when they were informed about others’ estimates. These results were replicated in Experiment 3, where the outcome did not depend on others’ requests or contributions.

Key Words: outcome-desirability bias • resource uncertainty • social dilemmas

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, Vol. 3, No. 4, 351-365 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/1368430200003004002
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 Group Processes Intergroup RelationsHome page
W. T. Au and M. Y. Ngai
Effects of Group Size Uncertainty and Protocol of Play in a Common Pool Resource Dilemma
Group Processes Intergroup Relations, July 1, 2003; 6(3): 265 - 283.
[Abstract] [PDF]