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Do Groups Exclude Others More Readily Than Individuals in Coalition Formation?

Leiden University, vanbeest{at}fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Rudy B. Andeweg

Leiden University

Lukas Koning

Leiden University

Paul A. M. van Lange

Leiden University and Free University

The present research compared interindividual and intergroup coalition processes. We examined whether groups are more likely to form small coalitions than individuals, and whether this tendency would depend on the social value orientation of the coalition party. Consistent with our hypothesis, results revealed that proselfs formed more small coalitions in intergroup settings than in interindividual settings whereas prosocials formed a similar number of small coalitions in both intergroup and interindividual settings. These and complementary findings add credence to the claim that people who are self-oriented are more likely to exclude others to maximize their own payoff and that such processes are especially pronounced in intergroup settings.

Key Words: coalition formation • discontinuity effect • exclusion • multiparty negotiation • social value orientations

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This Article Abstract Full Text (PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in ISI Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Add to My Marked Citations Google Scholar Articles by van Beest, I. Articles by van Lange, P. A. M. Social Bookmarking                   What's this?