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Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, 245-258 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/1368430299023003
© 1999 SAGE Publications

Conditional Contributions and Public Good Provision: Perceptions, Motives, and Behavioral Reactions

Eric van Dijk

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University, Dijk{at}rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl

Henk Wilke

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University

Previous studies have demonstrated that communication facilitates the provision of public goods, and that part of the success of communication lies in its propensity to elicit promises to contribute. In this article we focus on reactions to conditional promises, and in particular on `promises than cannot be broken' (i.e. conditional contributions). In an experimental study, participants were led to believe they were a member of a five-person group in which one member made a conditional contribution. The results of this study suggest that behavioral reactions to conditional contributions are a function of the motivation ascribed to conditional contributors, which in turn appears to be a function of the interest conditional contributors have in providing the public good. In more general terms, the results suggest that group members reciprocate the motivation they ascribe to the conditional contributor.

Key Words: fairness • promises • public goods • reciprocity • social dilemmas

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